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1. Introduction
Adjectives like tough and easy can appear in two syntactic frames that are at least super-
cially synonymous. In the expletive construction, the adjective takes an innitival
clause as its argument, and the matrix subject position is lled with an expletive (1a). In the
tough -construction, the adjective combines with two elements: an innitival clause
containing a gap and a subject DP that is semantically interpreted in the gap position (1b).
(1) a. Expletive construction
It is tough to please Alex.
b. Tough-construction
Alex1 is tough to please 1.
The syntactic and semantic relation between the two frames in (1) has been the subject of
much debate throughout the history of generative grammar, beginning with Lees (1960)
and Chomsky (1964). At this point, there is a common consensus in the literature that
A-movement takes place within the innitival clause in tough-constructions (1b), but not
in expletive constructions (1a). Chomsky (1977, 1982) observes that in tough-constructions,
(i) the embedded innitival clause forms a wh-island, (ii) no wh-islands or NP-islands may
intervene between the gap and the left edge of the innitival clause, and (iii) parasitic
gaps are licensed within the innitival clause. He concludes that A-movement from the
gap position to the edge of the innitival clause must take place in tough-constructions, a
stance that is shared in the majority of the literature.
More controversial are the questions of (i) what the A-moving element is and (ii) how it
relates to the surface subject of the tough-predicate. Within the theoretically and factually
rich literature on tough-constructions, two basic families of accounts can be distinguished,
which dier in their answers to these two questions. The rst family of analyses, which we
will refer to as the long-movement analysis, proposes that the A-moving element is
the surface subject itself. Originating in the gap position, this DP rst A-moves to the edge
of the innitival clause and then A-moves to the matrix subject position. The resulting
derivation for (1b) on this account is sketched in (2).
(2) Derivation of (1b) on a long-movement analysis
Alex1 is tough [ t 1 PROarb to please t 1 ]
AA
Long-movement accounts of tough-constructions have been developed by Rosenbaum
(1967), Postal (1971), Postal and Ross (1971), Brody (1993), Hornstein (2001), Hicks (2009),
Hartman (2011, 2012a,b), Fleisher (2013), and Longenbaugh (2015). On a long-movement
account, then, the tough-construction is derived from the expletive construction, oering a
relatively straightforward account of their apparent synonymy.
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The second family of analyses proposes that the matrix subject is base-generated in the
matrix clause. Inside the embedded clause, the gap position contains a null operator that is
A-moved to the edge of the embedded clause. The link between the matrix subject and the
null operator, and hence via proxy to the embedded gap, is created semantically. We will
refer to this latter family of analyses as the base-generation analysis. The structure of
(1b) on this account is schematised in (3).
(3) Derivation of (1b) on a base-generation analysis
Alex1 is tough [ Op1 PROarb to please t 1 ]
A
Base-generation accounts have been proposed by Ross (1967), Akmajian (1972), Lasnik and
Fiengo (1974), Chomsky (1977), Chomsky (1981), Williams (1983), Rezac (2006), and Fleisher
(2013, 2015), although notably for Rezac (2006) and Fleisher (2013, 2015), the crucial linking
between the tough-subject and the gap is accomplished by Agree relations.
In this paper, we subject to closer scrutiny one particularly inuential recent argument
in favour of the long-movement analysis of tough-constructions. Hartman (2011, 2012a,b)
discovered that experiencer PPs lead to ungrammaticality in tough-constructions, but not
in expletive constructions, as illustrated in (4), where the experiencer PP to Mary is licit
only in the expletive construction (4a), not in the tough-construction (4b).
(4) a. It is important (to Mary) to avoid cholesterol.
b. Cholesterol1 is important (*to Mary) to avoid 1. (Hartman 2012a: 125)
Hartman also observes that there is no general incompatibility between a tough-construction
and an experiencer PP. For example, if the PP is located above the matrix subject, the sen-
tence is grammatical (5).
(5) (To Mary), cholesterol1 is important to avoid 1.
Based on a similar type of intervention eect in A-raising constructions in Romance
languages, Hartman argues that the ungrammaticality of an experiencer PP in (4b) is due
to defective intervention, whereby an element with inactive syntactic features blocks
A-movement over it (Chomsky 2000). Crucially, defective intervention is observed only
with A-movement and not with A-movement. He concludes from these considerations
that the intervention eect in (4b) reveals the presence of an A-movement step over the
experiencer PP to Mary. Because only the long-movement analysis (2), but not the base-
generation analysis (3), postulates such an A-movement step, Hartman concludes that the
intervention eect provides a compelling argument in favour of the former.
We argue in this paper that this argument is not valid and that the intervention ef-
fect discovered by Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) in fact provides evidence in favour of the
base-generation analysis (3). The core empirical contribution of this paper is the novel
observation that a PP intervention eect analogous to that in tough-constructions also
arises in constructions that do not involve A-movement, namely pretty-predicate construc-
tions (e.g. Marigolds are pretty to look at) and gapped degree phrases (e.g. Kittens are too
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cute to resist). The fact that these constructions exhibit intervention, yet lack the crucial
A-movement step, makes it clear that PP intervention is neither caused by nor a diagnostic
of A-movement. Consequently, the intervention eect in (4b) does not provide an argument
for an A-movement step in tough-constructions or for the long-movement analysis. This
conclusion converges with that reached by Bruening (2014) on independent grounds.
We develop a uniform account of the intervention eects as a semantic-type mis-
match. In particular, we propose that what unies tough-constructions, pretty-predicate
constructions, and gapped degree phrases is that they all have an embedded clause that is a
null-operator structure. Introducing an experiencer PP into these constructions creates an
irresolvable semantic-type mismatch, rooted in the embedded clause being a null-operator
structure. Our proposal has a number of consequences. First, it reverses the force of Hart-
man’s observation: the intervention eect provides an argument for the base-generation
analysis, not the long-movement analysis. Second, we propose and develop a semantics
for tough-predicates, an aspect of tough-constructions that has been largely ignored in the
literature (though see Partee 1977). Third, we argue that the intervention eect is semantic
in nature. It emerges as a direct consequence of the compositional semantics associated
with null-operator structures. As such, we argue for a reassessment of what appears to be
a syntactic locality constraint as an incompatibility in the semantic composition.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 reviews Hartman’s arguments for interven-
tion of an experiencer PP in tough-constructions and introduces three novel arguments of
our own. The empirical landscape is enriched in section 3, showing that the intervention
eect is not due to movement and thus cannot be cast in terms of defective intervention.
In section 4, we propose that the intervention eect is semantic in nature, the result of a
type mismatch induced by the experiencer PP and the embedded clause as a null-operator
structure. Section 5 concludes.
2. Experiencer intervention in tough-constructions
It is well-known since Chomsky (1973) that while two for-phrases can occur in the expletive
construction (6a), only one for-phrase can occur in the tough-construction (6b).1
(6) a. It is easy [ for the rich ] [ for the poor ] to do the work.
b. The work1 is easy [ for the rich ] (*[ for the poor ]) to do 1.
In (6a), for the rich is the experiencer PP of the tough-predicate easy, and for the poor
is the embedded subject. Surface inspection alone does not reveal which of the two for-
phrases survives in (6b). In particular, one challenge is that in the absence of an overt
embedded subject, an experiencer PP dictates the construal of the embedded PRO subject;
see section 4.1 for more details. In short, the for-phrase in tough-constructions is by default
interpreted as both the experiencer and the embedded subject. Therefore, it is necessary to
look elsewhere for evidence about the status of the surviving for-phrase.
1 For ease of exposition, we descriptively refer to the string ‘for+embedded subject’ as a ‘for-phrase’, although
on standard analyses the two elements do not form a constituent. Nothing hinges on this terminological
choice.
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Before Hartman (2011, 2012a,b), it was standardly assumed that the for-phrase to survive
in tough-constructions is the experiencer PP and that it is the embedded subject that
must disappear (e.g. Faraci 1974; Lasnik and Fiengo 1974; Rezac 2006). Hartman, however,
provides a number of compelling arguments against this view and instead advances the
generalisation in (7).
(7) Hartman’s Generalisation
In a tough-construction, no experiencer phrase can intervene between the tough-
predicate and the embedded innitival clause.
In light of the novelty of Hartman’s conclusion, this section reviews six arguments sup-
porting (7). The rst three arguments are from Hartman (2011, 2012a,b). The remaining
three are novel arguments of our own that provide converging evidence.
2.1. Unambiguous PPs
Hartman’s (2011, 2012a,b) most direct argument comes from tough-predicates whose expe-
riencer PP can be headed by a preposition other than for . Such tough-predicates allow one
to circumvent the homophony between the experiencer and the embedded subject that
would otherwise arise, as in (6). We have already seen one example of an experiencer PP
headed by to in (4), which is repeated below in (8). Another example is provided in (9).2
(8) a. (=4)It is important (to Mary) to avoid cholesterol.
b. Cholesterol1 is important (*to Mary) to avoid 1. (Hartman 2012a: 125)
(9) a. It was very hard (on me) to give up sugar.
b. Sugar1 was very hard (*on me) to give up 1. (Hartman 2012a: 125)
In (9a), the PP on me is unambiguously the experiencer of hard; it cannot be an embedded
subject. The fact that this PP is ungrammatical in the corresponding tough-construction
(9b) shows that it is experiencer PPs that are disallowed in tough-constructions.
2.2. Scope
The second argument put forth by Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) is based on scope. In the expletive
construction, a for-phrase can take scope either above or below the tough-predicate in
the matrix clause (10a). This ambiguity corresponds to the two possible construals of the
for-phrase. If for every student is construed as an experiencer, it takes matrix scope, whereas,
if it is construed as the embedded subject, it takes embedded scope. Hartman observes that
crucially, the corresponding tough-construction only allows for an embedded scope reading
2 Gluckman (2016) argues that the intervention eect in tough-constructions is a prohibition on having the
tough-subject in the domain of two dierent perspective holders, namely the experiencer in the embedded
clause and the speaker in the matrix clause. (9b) shows, however, that such an analysis is incorrect because
the experiencer and the speaker are the same, yet there is still intervention.
4
of the for-phrase (10b). This restriction indicates that the for-phrase must be construed as
the embedded subject in tough-constructions.
(10) a. It is impossible [ for every student ] to fail this test.
(impossible≫ every student; every student≫ impossible)
b. This test1 is impossible [ for every student ] to fail 1.
(impossible≫ every student; *every student≫ impossible)
The fact that a matrix construal of for every student is impossible in (10b) follows if experi-
encer PPs are disallowed in tough-constructions.
2.3. Crosslinguistic evidence
Hartman’s (2011, 2012a,b) third argument comes from languages that do not allow an
innitival subject to be overtly expressed. In Italian, for example, a PP headed by per ‘for’
is optional in the expletive construction (11a). Because per can never be used to introduce
an innitival subject in Italian, only an experiencer construal of per gli studenti is possible
in (11a). (11b) shows that the presence of this experiencer PP yields ungrammaticality in
tough-constructions, a constraint that follows from (7).
(11) a. [Italian]È
is
impossibile
impossible
(per
for
gli
the
studenti
students
) capire
understand
questi
these
problemi.
problems
‘It is impossible (for the students) to understand these problems.’
b. Questi
these
problemi1
problems
sono
are
impossibile
impossible
(*per
for
gli
the
studenti
students
) da
da
capire
understand
1.
‘These problems are impossible (*for the students) to understand.’
(Hartman 2012a: 123)
2.4. Partial control
In addition to Hartman’s (2011, 2012a,b) three arguments, we will present three more pieces
of evidence that support Hartman’s Generalisation in (7).
The rst of these arguments is based on partial control, where PRO denotes a superset
of its controller (Landau 2000 et seq). In (12a), the embedded verb gather requires a plural
subject.3 Crucially, the singular DP Mary is unable to satisfy this requirement; rather, the
plural-subject requirement of gather can only be satised in (12a) if the embedded clause
contains a plural PRO. This in turn entails that for Mary be construed as the experiencer PP
of tough and partially control PRO. In other words, the only licit structure for (12a) is one in
which the for-phrase is the experiencer PP of the tough-predicate and it partially controls
PRO. Contrast the expletive construction in (12a) with the corresponding tough-construction
in (12b), which is notably infelicitous.
3 Standardly, meet is used to diagnose partial control. However, Poole (2015) observes that meet with a
singular subject is in fact allowed in some environments where other plural predicates are not, e.g. John
can meet at 5pm. Thus, its status as a diagnostic of partial control is confounded. Gather , on the other hand,
does not face this problem, e.g. *John can gather at 5pm.
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(12) a. It will be tough for Mary1 [ PRO1+ to gather in this park ].
b. #This park1 will be tough [ for Mary to gather in 1 ].
What the infelicity of (12b) shows is that a structure in which the for-phrase is an experiencer
PP and the embedded subject is plural PRO is unavailable in tough-constructions. The
contrast between (12a) and (12b) follows straightforwardly from (7): As experiencer PPs are
impossible in tough-constructions, for Mary must be construed as the embedded subject in
(12b). This precludes PRO inside the embedded innitival clause, and Mary, as a singular
DP, violates the plural-subject requirement of gather .
2.5. Animacy
As shown in (13), it is possible for the for-phrase in tough-constructions to be inanimate
(pace Faraci 1974).
(13) a. It is easy for the chalk to stick to the blackboard.
b. The blackboard1 is easy for the chalk to stick to 1.
The grammaticality of (13b) provides an indirect argument for the claim that experiencer
PPs are prohibited in tough-constructions. In (13), an experiencer construal of the inanimate
DP the chalk would give rise to infelicity. Therefore, for the chalk must be an embedded
subject in both (13a) and (13b). The acceptability of (13b) thus shows that it is possible for the
for-phrase in tough-constructions to be the embedded subject. Recall now Chomsky’s (1973)
observation in (6b) that only a single for-phrase is allowed in tough-constructions. Taken
together, these two observations entail that the for-phrase in tough-constructions must be
the embedded subject and that experiencer PPs are disallowed in tough-constructions.
The animacy restriction gives rise to a prediction with respect to scope in the expletive
construction. If the for-phrase is inanimate, as in (13a), only an embedded subject construal
is pragmatically feasible, and, as such, the for-phrase should be conned to embedded
scope. This prediction is indeed borne out, as shown in (14).4
(14) It is hard [ for every piece of chalk ] to stick to the blackboard.
(hard≫ every; #every≫ hard)
This corroborates the conclusion that inanimate for-phrases are invariably embedded
subjects and that this is the only position available to the for-phrase in tough-constructions.
2.6. Arbitrary experiencer interpretation
Finally, the experiencer in a tough-construction can be interpreted as arbitrary, even in the
presence of a for-phrase. This is illustrated in (15). The embedded clause in (15) contains the
adverb courageously in order to facilitate an embedded subject interpretation of for Sue. An
experiencer construal of for Sue would assert that Sue walks the tightrope courageously and
is simultaneously scared by doing so, a reading that attributes contradictory attitudes to
4 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this correct prediction of the animacy facts in (13).
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Sue. Neither the expletive construction in (15a) nor the tough-construction in (15b) enforces
such an interpretation.
(15) a. It is scary for Sue to walk the tightrope courageously.
b. The tightrope1 is scary for Sue to walk 1 courageously.
Rather, the most natural reading of both sentences in (15) is that Sue’s courageous walking
of the tightrope is scary for someone else, e.g. her concerned parents. To achieve this latter
interpretation, for Sue must be construed as the embedded subject and the experiencer
must be interpreted as arbitrary. The fact that both (15a) and (15b) have this noncontra-
dictory interpretation then demonstrates that an embedded subject interpretation of the
for-phrase is available in both structures. Analogous to the argument based on animacy,
(15b) demonstrates that a for-phrase can in principle be an embedded subject in tough-
constructions. In light of Chomsky’s (1973) observation that only one for-phrase survives
in tough-constructions (recall (6b)), we conclude that the surviving for-phrase must be the
embedded subject. Consequently, experiencer PPs must be ruled out in tough-constructions.
2.7. Section summary
In this section, we have presented six arguments that experiencer PPs are possible in exple-
tive constructions, but not in tough-constructions, as stated in Hartman’s Generalisation
(7), repeated below in (16) for convenience.
(16) Hartman’s Generalisation (=7)
In a tough-construction, no experiencer phrase can intervene between the tough-
predicate and the embedded innitival clause.
The question that arises is why such a restriction should hold in the rst place and what
it reveals about the syntax of tough-constructions. Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) argues that
the generalisation provides evidence for the long-movement analysis, proposing that the
intervention is syntactic in nature. Based on the observation that experiencer PPs cause
intervention in A-raising constructions in a number of languages (e.g. French, Spanish,
and Greek; see McGinnis 1998, Torrego 1996, and Anagnostopoulou 2003 respectively),
Hartman adopts the view that A-movement over an experiencer PP causes a ‘defective
intervention’ eect, a term due to Chomsky (2000). Hartman proposes that experiencer
intervention is explained on the long-movement analysis precisely because this account
postulates A-movement into the matrix subject position, as schematised in (17).
(17) Hartman’s (2011, 2012a,b) account of experiencer intervention (16)
Cholesterol is important [PP to Mary ] [ t 1 PROarb to avoid t 1 ]
A
7
A
7
Moreover, because the base-generation analysis, on the other hand, does not postulate
any syntactic dependency between the matrix subject and the embedded clause,5 Hartman
reasons that the intervention eect remains unaccounted for on this family of analyses.
As such, experiencer intervention would appear to provide a forceful argument for the
long-movement analysis of tough-constructions.
In the next section, we argue that, upon closer investigation, the experiencer inter-
vention facts do not support the long-movement analysis, but, conversely, constitute
compelling evidence in favour of the base-generation analysis. We crucially show that in-
tervention also arises in structures that do not contain an A-movement step. Consequently,
experiencer intervention cannot be attributed to A-movement. We then propose that the
constraint is in fact semantic in nature wherein an experiencer PP leads to an irresolvable
semantic-type mismatch in constructions containing a null-operator structure. On this
view, tough-constructions are subject to experiencer intervention precisely because they
instantiate a null-operator structure.
3. PP intervention is not about movement
This section presents a number of arguments that the empirical landscape is somewhat
more intricate than Hartman’s Generalisation (7) makes it out to be. Once these further
considerations are taken into account, the intervention facts do not support the long-
movement analysis of tough-constructions. First, as Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) himself notes,
the clear instances of A-movement in English, like subject-to-subject raising, do not exhibit
PP intervention. Second, Bruening (2014) has observed that intervention is not solely caused
by experiencer PPs, but also by adverbs, which crucially do not trigger intervention eects
in any known cases of A-movement. Third, PP intervention eects arise in structures that do
not involve A-movement, namely pretty-predicate constructions and gapped degree phrases.
Fourth, argument PPs do not incur an intervention eect, which remains mysterious on a
defective intervention account.
5 A noteworthy exception is Rezac’s (2006) account, adopted in Fleisher (2013, 2015). In this account, matrix
T0 enters into an Agree relation with the embedded clause. Fleisher (2013: 327, 2015: 96, fn. 32) proposes
that this Agree relation is responsible for the intervention eect. One problem for this account is that
Rezac (2006) argues that copy-raising constructions also involve this Agree relation. Crucially, however,
copy-raising constructions do not exhibit intervention eects (i).
(i) John1 seems [PP to Mary ] like he1’s the smartest guy in the world.
To the extent that copy-raising constructions allow us to independently diagnose the properties of the
alleged Agree step, the PP intervention facts are unaccounted for on this analysis because, as (i) shows,
the Agree step could not be subject to intervention. Note that it is of course possible to reconcile the
Agree account with the lack of intervention in copy raising by stipulating that seem is somehow immune
to intervention. One desirable consequence of the account developed here in section 4 is that it does not
require any special status for raising verbs like seem; the absence of intervention in A-movement structures
follows directly because A-movement is never subject to intervention in English. Thanks to a reviewer for
discussion of this issue.
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3.1. Nonintervention in A-movement
A-movement over an experiencer PP without intervention is widely attested in English, as
Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) himself notes (see also Bruening 2014). For instance, subject-to-
subject raising in English, the prototypical example of A-movement, is possible across an
experiencer PP (18).
(18) John1 seems [PP to Mary ] t 1 to be happy.
A
The fact that established cases of A-movement are possible across an experiencer PP
undermines the basic claim that PP intervention diagnoses or is related to A-movement
over this PP.6
3.2. Intervention of adjuncts
An important contribution to the intervention generalisation is made by Bruening (2014).
Bruening observes that intervention in tough-constructions is not limited to experiencer
PPs. Regular adjuncts likewise incur an intervention eect (19). Crucially, these adjuncts
do not block A-movement in English (20).
(19) a. It is always annoying [PP at meetings ] to talk about the budget.
b. *The budget1 is always annoying [PP at meetings ] to talk about 1.
(Bruening 2014: 710)
(20) John seemed [PP at the meeting ] to be agitated.
The same intervention eect of adjuncts is found in Romance languages, as shown in (21)
for Italian.
(21) a. [Italian]È
is
dicile
dicult
[PP al
at.the
crepuscolo
twilight
] vedere
to.see
questi
these
colori
colors
‘It is dicult at twilight to see these colors’
b. *Questi
these
colori1
colors
sono
are
dicili
dicult
[PP al
at.the
crepuscolo
twilight
] da
da
vedere
to.see
1
‘These colors are dicult at twilight to see’ (Bruening 2014: 711–712)
6 Hartman (2012a) does propose an account of why there is no intervention in raising constructions. His
account is built on the stipulation that A-movement in raising constructions leaves a trace, while A-
movement in tough-constructions does not. This critical dierence remains itself unaccounted for. The
account is thus construction-specic in that it invokes a type of A-movement that only applies in tough-
constructions. No such stipulation is necessary on a base-generation account: there is no A-movement in
tough-constructions and A-movement is not subject to intervention (at least in English). A second problem
with Hartman’s (2012a) account is that it is incompatible with A-movement in the lower clause, as such
movement would leave a trace and thereby obviate the intervention eect in tough-constructions, contrary
to fact. Thanks to Jeremy Hartman for discussion of this issue.
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What Bruening (2014) importantly shows is that Hartman’s original generalisation is too
narrow in that the class of interveners is broader than previously thought. This extended
generalisation is stated in (22).
(22) Bruening’s Generalisation
In a tough-construction, no experiencer phrase or adjunct can intervene between the
tough-predicate and the embedded innitival clause.
Bruening (2014) concludes that (22) discredits a defective intervention account because
adjuncts do not intervene for A-movement, in English or elsewhere. However, Bruening
(2014) does not develop an alternative analysis of the intervention eect. The account that
we propose in section 4 captures the extended generalisation in (22).
3.3. PP intervention in nonmovement structures
Bruening’s (2014) extension of Hartman’s (2011, 2012a,b) intervention generalisation only
concerns the class of interveners in tough-constructions. In this section, we demonstrate
another extension of Hartman’s Generalisation: intervention is not limited to tough-
constructions. Identical intervention eects arise in constructions that do not plausibly
contain A-movement. This makes it clear that A-movement cannot be what underlies the
intervention eect.
As is well-known, there are constructions that resemble tough-constructions, but cru-
cially lack an expletive counterpart (Lasnik and Fiengo 1974). A traditional example are
constructions with adjectives like pretty and tasty (23). We refer to this class of adjectives
as pretty -predicates.
(23) a. Marigolds1 are pretty to look at 1.
b. * It is pretty to look at marigolds.
c. Oatmeal1 is tasty to eat 1.
d. * It is tasty to eat oatmeal.
The ungrammaticality of the expletive baselines in (23b) and (23d) makes it clear that (23a)
and (23c) cannot be derived from them via movement. Put dierently, the derivation of (23a),
for instance, cannot involve A-movement of marigolds from within the innitival clause
into the matrix subject position.7 Nevertheless, pretty-predicate constructions display the
same PP intervention eect as tough-constructions, as shown in (24). Although pretty-
7 A reviewer asks whether a long-movement account could be reconciled with (23) by assuming that pretty-
predicates select for a complement clause out of which A-movement is required. There are at least two
factors that make such an account unappealing. First, the primary motivation for a long-movement account
of tough-constructions is the (near) synonymy with their expletive counterparts. If the long movement is
semantically vacuous, we would have a relatively straightforward account of their apparent synonymy. In
the case of pretty-predicates, if (23a,c) were derived by long A-movement, they would have the nonsensical
meanings of (23b,d), contrary to fact (see Lasnik and Fiengo 1974). Second, pretty-predicate constructions
pass the same A-diagnostics that tough-constructions do: the embedded clause forms a wh-island (i.a), the
relation between the matrix subject and the embedded gap is subject to Deniteness Islands (i.b), and the
same relation licenses parasitic gaps (i.c):
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predicates can in principle occur with an experiencer PP (24a), this experiencer cannot
occur between the predicate itself and the embedded innitival clause (24b). Moreover, just
like in the case of tough-constructions, the two can cooccur if the PP occupies a position
above the matrix subject (24c).
(24) a. Mary is pretty [PP to John ].
b. *Mary1 is pretty [PP to John ] to look at 1.
c. [PP To John ], Mary1 is pretty to look at 1.
The PP intervention eect in (24) is thus descriptively identical to that in tough-constructions.
However, because pretty-predicate constructions do not involve long A-movement, i.e.
A-movement from the embedded clause into the matrix clause, (24b) does not involve
A-movement of Mary over the experiencer PP. On a defective intervention account, it is
therefore mysterious why the PP should give rise to intervention. Rather, the fact that the
intervention eect occurs in a nonmovement structure like (24b) strongly suggests that it
is not caused by A-movement.
A second construction that exhibits PP intervention in spite of not containing a long
A-movement step are gapped degree phrases (GDPs) (Brillman 2014).8 Like pretty-
predicate constructions, GDPs can occur in a tough-construction (25a), but lack an expletive
counterpart (25b). Therefore, (25a) cannot be derived from (25b) by long A-movement of
this table.
(25) a. This table1 is too heavy to lift 1.
b. * It is too heavy to lift this table.
In principle, it is possible for an experiencer PP to modify the adjective in a GDP because it
can do so in the absence of an innitival clause (26).
(26) This table is too heavy for John.
Moreover, a for-phrase is in fact possible in conjunction with an innitival clause (27).
However, just as in the case of tough-constructions, the status of this for-phrase is unclear
(i) a. *[ What (spice) ]2 is oatmeal1 tasty [ to eat 1 with 2 ]?
b. *Oatmeal1 is tasty [ to eat [ the bowl of 1 ]].
c. Oatmeal1 is not tasty [ to eat 1 [ without cooking pg ]].
In other words, pretty-predicate constructions have the syntax of tough-constructions in that there is
A-movement in the embedded clause. Thus, a long-movement analysis of pretty-predicate constructions
would be forced to require pretty-predicates to select for a complement clause in which A-movement has
taken place and out of which A-movement is required. This would be unlike any other known predicate
in natural language, and it is unclear how one would state such a requirement technically as it is not the
case that the predicate itself would mediate these movement dependencies. In sum, we conclude that a
long-movement account does not extend to pretty-predicates for both theoretical and empirical reasons.
8 Brillman (2014) is the rst to observe PP intervention eects in GDPs. However, she treats PP intervention
as a diagnostic for A-movement and proposes that GDPs involve an A-movement step of a null operator to
the edge of the degree phrase. Therefore, her analysis does not involve long A-movement.
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based on surface inspection alone. It could be either an experiencer PP on a par with (26),
or it could be the embedded subject.
(27) This table1 is too heavy for John to lift 1.
Following Hartman’s (2011, 2012a,b) reasoning discussed in section 2.2, scope can be used
to identify the status of the for-phrase in (27). Consider the paradigm in (28). The sentence
in (28a) is ambiguous. On one reading, where only one scopes above too heavy, all but
one of the workers has the ability to lift the table by herself. On the other reading, where
only one scopes below too heavy, the table is of too great a weight such that it cannot be
lifted by any one worker individually, i.e. only a group of at least two workers is able to
lift it. This ambiguity is the result of the variable attachment of for only one worker . If it
attaches inside the lower clause, it takes narrow scope relative to too heavy, whereas, if it
attaches inside the matrix clause, it scopes above too heavy. Support for this view comes
from (28b), in which the PP unambiguously attaches in the matrix clause. Consequently,
only a wide scope interpretation in the matrix clause is available for only. Against this
backdrop, the crucial example is (28c). In (28c), the for-phrase occurs between the predicate
and the innitival clause. In this case, only the narrow scope interpretation of for only one
worker is possible.
(28) a. The table1 is too heavy to lift 1 [PP for only one worker ].
(only one≫ too heavy; too heavy≫ only one))
b. [PP For only one worker ] the table1 is too heavy to lift 1.
(only one≫ too heavy; *too heavy≫ only one)
c. The table1 is too heavy [PP for only one worker ] to lift 1.
(*only one≫ too heavy; too heavy≫ only one)
The unavailability of matrix scope of only in (28c) indicates that the for-phrase must attach
inside the embedded innitival clause. In other words, it has to be the embedded subject
and cannot be construed as an experiencer PP of the matrix predicate.
This state of aairs is entirely analogous to the tough-construction facts in section 2.2:
An otherwise ambiguous for-phrase cannot be construed as the experiencer of the matrix
predicate if it intervenes between the predicate and the innitival clause. There is hence
every reason to believe that tough-constructions and GDPs instantiate the same constraint.
Crucially, GDPs cannot be derived via long A-movement. As a consequence, a defective
intervention account of PP intervention along the lines of (17) does not generalise to GDPs.
Converging evidence for the conclusion that experiencer PPs are impossible in GDPs
comes from Romance. Recall from section 2.3 that languages like Italian do not allow the
subject of an innitival clause to be introduced by (the equivalent of) a for-phrase. Any
PP following the matrix predicate must be an experiencer. We reviewed in section 2.2
Hartman’s observation that such PPs are impossible in tough-constructions. (29) shows that
the same restriction holds for GDPs. Adjectives modied by the degree operator troppo ‘too’
can occur with an experiencer PP in the absence of the innitival clause (29a). However,
this becomes impossible in a GDP (29b).
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(29) a. [Italian]Questo
this
tavolo
table
e’
is
troppo
too
pesante
heavy
(per
for
me
me
).
‘This table is too heavy (for me).’
b. Questo
this
tavolo1
table
e’
is
troppo
too
pesante
heavy
(*per
for
me
me
) da
to
sollevare
lift
1.
Intended: ‘This table is too heavy for me to lift.’ (Ilaria Frana, p.c.)
In sum, pretty-predicate constructions and GDPs exhibit the same restriction that
Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) observes for tough-constructions: An experiencer PP cannot inter-
vene between the predicate and the embedded innitival clause. However, unlike tough-
constructions, neither pretty-predicate constructions nor GDPs plausibly involve long
A-movement because they lack the expletive, nonmovement counterpart. Therefore, the
PP intervention eect cannot be attributed to an interaction of this PP with A-movement,
contra Hartman (2011, 2012a,b).
The claim that the intervention in pretty-predicate constructions and GDPs is the
same as that in tough-constructions makes an interesting prediction: Given that interven-
tion in tough-constructions is not only caused by experiencer PPs, but also by adjuncts
(see section 3.2), we predict that adjuncts should likewise give rise to intervention with
pretty-predicates and GDPs. This prediction is indeed borne out, as shown in (30) and (31)
respectively.
(30) a. Mary will be pretty [PP at her wedding ].
b. *Mary1 will be pretty [PP at her wedding ] to look at 1.
(31) a. [PP With all these books ] the table1 will be too heavy to lift 1.
b. *The table1 will be too heavy [PP with all these books ] to lift 1.
The observations in this section and section 3.1 give rise to a double dissociation
between PP intervention and A-movement: Subject-to-subject raising makes it clear that A-
movement across an experiencer PP does not result in intervention (in English), and pretty-
predicate constructions and GDPs demonstrate that PP intervention exists in the absence of
A-movement. The combination of these two observations shows that there is no connection
between PP intervention and A-movement. At the very least, then, PP intervention in
tough-constructions does not diagnose the presence of A-movement. Consequently, PP
intervention does not provide an argument for the long-movement analysis of tough-
constructions.
3.4. Nonintervening PPs
A nal complication for the defective intervention account is that not all PPs cause an
intervention eect. While experiencer PPs and adjuncts do, what we will call argument
PPs do not. This is shown in (32) for tough-constructions and in (33) for GDPs.9
9 Thanks to Nicholas Longenbaugh for bringing examples like (32) to our attention.
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(32) a. It is damaging [PP to cars ] to drive over these trac cones.
b. These trac cones1 are damaging [PP to cars ] to drive over 1.
(Nicholas Longenbaugh, p.c.)
(33) a. John1 is too fond [PP of Mary ] to like 1.
b. John1 is too angry [PP at Mary ] to invite 1.
No such asymmetry between argument and experiencer PPs is expected on a defective
intervention account. If anything, argument PPs would be predicted to be more prone to
causing intervention than experiencer PPs, precisely the reverse of what is found.
3.5. Section summary: A new generalisation
We argued in section 2 that the core empirical insight of Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) is cor-
rect: experiencer PPs give rise to intervention in tough-constructions. Bruening (2014)
demonstrated that Hartman’s original generalisation was too narrow in that adjuncts
likewise cause intervention in tough-constructions. We have in turn shown that Bruening’s
(2014) extended generalisation in (22) is itself part of an even broader generalisation that
incorporates pretty-predicate constructions and GDPs. The empirical generalisation that
we propose is stated in (34). It properly includes Hartman’s original generalisation (7) and
Bruening’s extended generalisation (22).
(34) Intervention Generalisation (nal version)
In tough-constructions, pretty-predicate constructions, and GDPs, no experiencer PP
or adjunct may occur between the adjective and the embedded innitival clause.
The empirical distribution of the intervention eect is thus both broader and more nuanced
than depicted in Hartman (2011, 2012a,b). In particular, we have shown that (i) PPs do not
cause intervention in structures that unambiguously involve A-movement, e.g. subject-to-
subject raising; (ii) PP intervention also arises in structures that could not plausibly involve
long A-movement, i.e. pretty-predicate constructions and GDPs; (iii) adjunct PPs that do
not intervene for A-movement cause intervention in tough-constructions, pretty-predicate
constructions, and GDPs; and (iv) PPs do not intervene if they are an argument PP of the
adjective. (34) encapsulates these ndings.
Taken together, the facts discussed in this section make it clear that A-movement does
not underlie the intervention eect as A-movement is neither necessary nor sucient
for intervention to arise. Consequently, PP intervention in tough-constructions does not
provide an argument for the existence of A-movement in these constructions and hence
does not constitute evidence for the long-movement analysis. In the next section, we
present our account of the intervention eect as a semantic-type mismatch.
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4. Analysis
If the intervention eect is not due to movement, what causes it then? This section ar-
gues that what underlies the intervention eect in tough-constructions, pretty-predicate
constructions, and GDPs is that the embedded clause in all of them is a null-operator
structure. In a null-operator structure, the operator A-moves from the gap position to
the edge of the embedded clause, which is then interpreted as a λ-abstraction over the
trace (35) (Nissenbaum 2000).
(35) Null-operator structure[ Op1 [ . . . t 1 . . .]] ↝ LF: λx[. . .x . . .]
A
We show that experiencer PPs and adjuncts give rise to an irresolvable semantic-type
mismatch when introduced in a construction in which the embedded clause is a null-
operator structure. This incompatibility is the result of experiencer PPs and adjuncts only
combining with propositions, while null-operator structures crucially denote properties.
The argumentation begins by sketching a semantics for tough-predicates that includes
the essential ingredients to their interpretation. Next, this independently needed semantics
for tough-predicates is shown to disallow experiencer PPs and adjuncts occurring between
the adjective and the embedded clause in tough-constructions, thus deriving the interven-
tion eect. Finally, we show that this analysis of the intervention eect as a semantic-type
mismatch extends to pretty-predicate constructions and GDPs without further ado.
For the sake of concreteness, the main text will present one uniform rendition of our
general proposal that the intervention eect is due to a semantic-type mismatch. There
are a handful of alternative ways of implementing our general proposal, using the same
semantic ingredients. We present what we believe to be the simplest rendition, though we
will note conceivable alternatives as we proceed (see fn. 14 and 16 in particular).
4.1. Semantics of tough-predicates
Tough-predicates describe dispositions anchored to an individual. Thus, their semantics
comprise two essential ingredients.10 The rst ingredient is that their truth is evaluated
with respect to an individual, analogous to predicates of personal taste, e.g. tasty and fun.
In the sense of Lasersohn (2005), they are judge-dependent. As will be discussed in
section 4.2, this property is important because experiencer PPs serve to overtly specify the
judge. The second ingredient is that, as dispositions, they are modals and quantify over
possible worlds (Kratzer 1981). There are several ways to implement these two components.
We elect for a relatively straightforward semantics for tough-predicates that combines
the semantics of predicates of personal taste, capturing the judge dependency, and the
semantics of attitude predicates, capturing the modality.
We propose that the fundamental dierence between the tough-construction and the
expletive construction is that the embedded clause in the former is a null-operator struc-
10 The semantics of tough-predicates naturally also involves degrees. However, for the sake of simplicity, we
do not incorporate degrees because it does not play a role in the intervention eect.
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ture (following Chomsky 1977). As a result, the two constructions also dier in how the
embedded clause combines with the tough-predicate. We propose that tough-predicates
come in two variants that dier in the semantic type of the clausal complement with
which they combine.11 The rst variant combines with a proposition; this corresponds
to the expletive construction (36).12 The second variant combines with a property of
individuals; this corresponds to the tough-construction (37). Following Lasersohn (2005)
and Stephenson (2007, 2010), the judge is represented as the argument j of the denotation
function.
(36) ⟨st , st⟩Expletive-construction variant⟦toughexpl⟧j = λpst λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[toughw ′, j ′(⟦p⟧j ′)]
(37) ⟨⟨e, st⟩, ⟨e, st⟩⟩Tough-construction variant⟦toughtc⟧j = λQ⟨e,st⟩ λx λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[toughw ′, j ′(⟦Q⟧j ′(x))]
(38) accw,x = {⟨w ′,y⟩ ∶ it is compatible with what x believes in w for x to be y in w ′}
(39) toughw, j(p)⇔ p is tough to j in w
Both toughexpl and toughtc assert that some proposition is tough according to the judge j
in all of the centred worlds where j is the centre. Where they dier is in how this “tough-
proposition” is formed compositionally. For toughexpl, the tough-proposition is its single
propositional argument p. On the other hand, toughtc combines rst with an argument
denoting a property of individuals Q and then with an individual argument x . The tough-
proposition is then formed by saturating the predicate Q with x .
Another important fact about the semantics of tough-predicates that our analysis cap-
tures is the interpretation of PRO in the embedded clause. Bhatt and Izvorski (1997) observe
that PRO is obligatorily coreferential with the judge of the tough-predicate, regardless of
whether it is overt or implicit (see also Epstein 1984; Lebeaux 1984; Bhatt and Pancheva
2006). As will be discussed in section 4.2, the judge is overtly specied by the experiencer
PP. For example, in (40), the judge Mary is specied overtly by the experiencer PP, and
PRO, being coreferential with the judge, must refer to Mary. Crucially, (40) cannot have an
interpretation like (41) in which PRO refers to Bill.
11 Kratzer (2006) argues that the modality of attitude ascriptions does not originate in the attitude predicate
itself, but in the left periphery of the embedded clause (see also Moulton 2009, 2015; Bogal-Allbritten 2016).
Applied to tough-predicates, this approach would shift the dierence that we attribute to the tough-predicate
instead to the embedded clause, which already diers between the two constructions. We leave pursuing
this approach for future research. However, it is worth noting that such an analysis still has to encode
somewhere the syntactic frames available to each adjective. For example, pretty-predicates only have the
tough-construction, and adjectives like possible only have the expletive construction (while impossible has
both) (i). In our analysis, this variation derives from which of the denotations in (36) and (37) the adjective
has.
(i) a. It is (im)possible to lift this table.
b. This table1 is *(im)possible to lift 1.
12 We assume the following conventions: x and y are of type e (individual); w is of type s (possible world);
and st is an abbreviation for ⟨s, t⟩.
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(40) It was tough [ on Mary1 ] [ PRO1/*2 to avoid cholesterol ]↝ It was tough on Mary for Mary to avoid cholesterol
(41) It was tough [ on Mary ] [ for Bill to avoid cholesterol ]
When the judge of the tough-predicate is implicit, PRO nevertheless refers to the implicit
judge. However, the implicit judge is itself interpreted generically (42) or as referring to a
contextually salient individual (43); see Bhatt and Izvorski (1997) for discussion.
(42) It is fun [ PROarb to play hockey ] ↝ gen x [it is fun for x for x to play hockey]
(43) John: This morning, it was fun to play hockey on the newly frozen lake.↝ It was fun for John for John to play hockey
To capture this generalisation, we follow the independently motivated proposal of Stephen-
son (2007, 2010) that PRO refers directly to the judge j (44).
(44) ⟦PRO⟧j = j
We are now in a position to see how these proposals apply to derive the expletive con-
struction and the tough-construction. Let us take each in turn. In the expletive construction,
the tough-predicate directly takes a propositional argument p, as shown in (45).
(45) Derivation of the expletive construction
It is important [ PRO to avoid cholesterol ]
AP
CP
PRO to avoid cholesterol
important : st
: st
⟨st , st⟩ expl
a. ⟦CP⟧j = λw . avoid(cholesterol)(j)(w)
b. ⟦importantexpl⟧j = λpst λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[importantw ′, j ′(⟦p⟧j ′)]
c. ⟦AP⟧j = λw .∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[importantw ′, j ′(λw .avoid(cholesterol)(j′)(w))]
The derivation in (45) proceeds as follows: First, the tough-predicate important combines
with the embedded CP, which denotes a proposition (45c). Second, the judge argument j
is either bound by a generic operator or valued with a contextually salient individual.13
The result is truth conditions stating that in all of the centred worlds where j is the centre,
avoiding cholesterol is important to j.
In the tough-construction, the tough-predicate rst combines with an argument denoting
a property of individuals Q and then with an individual argument x . The embedded clause
is a null-operator structure wherein the null operator A-moves from the gap position to
13 Our analysis diers from Stephenson (2007, 2010) in that the judge of a judge-dependent predicate is not
one of its arguments. Thus, our implementation of judge-dependency is closer in spirit to Lasersohn (2005).
We assume that the judge parameter can be valued contextually or bound by a generic operator.
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the clause edge. The null operator is then interpreted as a λ-abstraction over its trace, as
illustrated in (46) (Nissenbaum 2000).
(46) Null-operator structure[ Op1 [ . . . t 1 . . .]] ↝ LF: λx[. . .x . . .]
A
Consequently, the null-operator structure denotes a property of individuals, which is the
appropriate semantic type to compose with the tough-construction variant of a tough-
predicate, as shown in (47).
(47) Derivation of the tough-construction
Cholesterol is important [ Op1 PRO to avoid 1 ]
AP2
AP1
CP
Op1 PRO to avoid 1
important
cholesterol
: ⟨e, st⟩
: ⟨e, st⟩
: st
⟨⟨e, st⟩, ⟨e, st⟩⟩tc
e
a. ⟦CP⟧j = λx λw . avoid(x)(j)(w)
b. ⟦importanttc⟧j = λQ⟨e,st⟩ λx λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[importantw ′, j ′(⟦Q⟧j ′(x))]
c. ⟦AP1⟧j = λx λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[importantw ′, j ′(λw .avoid(x)(j′)(w))]
d. ⟦AP2⟧j = λw .∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[importantw ′, j ′(λw .avoid(cholesterol)(j′)(w))]
The derivation in (47) proceeds as follows: First, the tough-predicate combines with the CP,
which denotes a property of individuals as a result of being a null-operator structure (47c).
Second, it combines with the tough-subject cholesterol and uses it to saturate the property
denoted by the CP (47d). Third, the judge argument j is either bound by a generic operator
or valued with a contextually salient individual. The result is truth conditions stating that
in all of the centred worlds where j is the centre, avoiding cholesterol is important to j.
4.2. Intervention is a semantic-type mismatch
The intervention eects detailed in sections 2 and 3 follow from our proposed semantics of
tough-predicates as a semantic-type mismatch. First, however, it is necessary to explicate
the contribution of the experiencer PP. The experiencer PP serves to overtly specify the
judge. There are two options as to how this PP is introduced into the structure. The PP could
either be an adjunct or it could be introduced by a designated functional head. While either
option is compatible with our proposal, we will assume here that the PP is introduced by
an Exp(eriencer) projection, following the widespread consensus that (external) arguments
of predicates are introduced by functional heads (Kratzer 1996; Pylkkänen 2002; amongst
18
others).14 The head Exp0 combines rst with a propositional argument p and then with the
experiencer PP j′′ (48). Its role is to shift the judge argument of the denotation function for
p to the individual(s) denoted by the experiencer PP.
(48) Introducing an experiencer PP⟦Exp0⟧j = λpst λj′′ λw . ⟦p⟧j ′′(w) ⟨st , ⟨e, st⟩⟩
Evidence that the experiencer PP species the judge of the tough-predicate comes from
the incompatibility of such PPs with other judge-introducing expressions.15 One such
expression is nd (Sæbø 2009; Kennedy 2013). If the experiencer PP species the judge,
combining it with nd is predicted to lead to an infelicitous “double specication” of the
judge. This prediction is indeed borne out, as shown in (49).
(49) a. #John nds it easy for the rich for the poor to do the work.
b. #John nds it important to Mary to avoid cholesterol.
The crucial property of Exp0 that will derive the intervention eect is that Exp0 only
combines with propositions and not with properties.
We make a handful of assumptions about the structure of the extended adjectival
projection, for the sake of concreteness. As we will show below, the semantics of Exp0
aords it the ability to attach at various points in the clausal spine, as long as its complement
denotes a proposition. For now, we will focus on ExpP occurring between AP and aP, as
schematised in (50). In this case, Exp0 parallels Appl0 in the extended verbal projection.
(50) Extended adjectival projection[aP . . . a0 [ExpP . . . Exp0 [AP . . . A0 . . . ] ] ]
head movement
The linear order of the experiencer PP with respect to the adjective is achieved by head
movement of A0 (through Exp0) to a0, much like in the verbal domain in English. Following
standard assumptions, this head movement reconstructs semantically. Consequently, the
experiencer PP always takes scope over the tough-predicate. This derives Hartman’s (2011,
2012a,b) observation that when a for-phrase has a matrix construal, i.e. as an experiencer,
it necessarily takes scope over the tough-predicate (see (10)). For readability, we will not
depict the movement of A0 to a0 in the examples to follow, because it does not aect the
semantics. Finally, the tough-subject is merged in [Spec, aP], parallel to how the external
argument of a verb merges in [Spec, vP].
Let us now consider how the addition of an experiencer PP interacts with our proposed
semantics of tough-predicates. As we will show, the intervention eect is correctly predicted
to occur in the tough-construction, but not in the expletive construction. In the expletive
14 Under a PP-adjunction analysis, P0 would have the following denotation: λj′′ λpst λw . ⟦p⟧j ′′(w).
15 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing the data in (49) to our attention.
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construction, the AP denotes a proposition. Therefore, it can successfully combine with
Exp0 and an experiencer PP, as shown in (51).16
(51) No semantic-type mismatch in the expletive construction
It is important [ to Mary ] [ PRO to avoid cholesterol ]
aP
ExpP2
ExpP1
AP
CP
PRO to avoid cholesterol
important
Exp0
PP
to Mary
a0
: st
: st
: ⟨e, st⟩
: st
: st
: e
⟨st , ⟨e, st⟩⟩
⟨st , st⟩ expl
a. ⟦AP⟧j = λw .∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j[importantw ′, j ′(λw .avoid(cholesterol)(j′)(w))]
b. ⟦ExpP1⟧j =
λj′′ λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw, j ′′[importantw ′, j ′(λw .avoid(cholesterol)(j′)(w))]
c. ⟦ExpP2⟧j =
λw . ∀⟨w ′, j′⟩ ∈ accw,Mary[importantw ′, j ′(λw .avoid(cholesterol)(j′)(w))]
The derivation in (51) proceeds as follows: First, the tough-predicate important combines
with the CP to form an AP that denotes a proposition (51a). Second, Exp0 takes the AP as
its propositional argument. This returns a property of individuals wherein the judge of the
proposition denoted by the AP is abstracted over by the unsaturated individual argument
j′′ of Exp0 (51b). Third, this individual argument is saturated with the experiencer PP to
Mary (51c). Most importantly, the AP denotes a proposition and therefore is of the correct
semantic type to compose with Exp0. As a result, the expletive construction is able to have
an experiencer PP occurring between the adjective and the embedded clause, i.e. there is
no intervention in the expletive construction.
However, in the tough-construction, Exp0 is unable to combine with the AP because the
AP denotes a property of individuals. This creates an irresolvable semantic-type mismatch,
as shown in (52).
16 To maximize the similarity with other argument-introducing heads, Exp0 could be type ⟨e, st⟩ and compose
with the AP via Event Identication (following Kratzer 1996). Our proposal would remain unaected, though
it is unclear how Exp0 could shift the judge of its complement via conjunction. It is also worth pointing
out that although this proposal would allow Exp0 to compose with the AP in a tough-construction via
Generalised Conjunction, as both would be properties, there would still be a semantic-type mismatch,
except now it would be when the derivation reaches the tough-subject, which would not be able to compose
with a proposition.
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(52) Semantic-type mismatch in the tough-construction
*Cholesterol is important [ to Mary ] [ Op1 PRO to avoid t 1 ]
aP
aP
ExpP
ExpP
AP
CP
Op1 PRO to avoid 1
important
Exp0
PP
to Mary
a0
cholesterol
: ⟨e, st⟩
: ⟨e, st⟩
7← Type mismatch!
⟨⟨e, st⟩, ⟨e, st⟩⟩tc
⟨st , ⟨e, st⟩⟩
The derivation in (52) proceeds as follows: First, the tough-predicate important combines
with the CP to form an AP that denotes a property of individuals. Second, Exp0 tries to
combine with the AP. Exp0 wants a propositional argument, but the AP denotes a property.
With no way to semantically compose these two elements, the derivation crashes.17 As a
result, the tough-construction is unable to have an experiencer PP occurring between the
adjective and the embedded clause, i.e. there is intervention in the tough-construction.
A semantic-type mismatch occurs with adjuncts as well. Ignoring tense, intervening
adjuncts are of type ⟨st , st⟩, crucially combining with a propositional argument, as Exp0
does. The AP in a tough-construction, which denotes a property of individuals, therefore
cannot compose with these adjuncts, as shown in (53).18
(53) Adjuncts result in a semantic-type mismatch
AP
AP
important [ Op1 to avoid 1 ]
Adjunct⟨st , st⟩ : ⟨e, st⟩
7← Type mismatch!
Although experiencer PPs and adjuncts cannot occur between the adjective and the
embedded clause, they can occur elsewhere in the sentence (54)–(55).
17 A question that arises is whether nonstandard modes of composition could in principle allow Exp0 and AP
to compose semantically in (52). The obvious candidate is Function Composition or its decomposed variant
of the Geach Rule followed by Function Application (Geach 1972; Jacobson 1999). The role of Function
Composition in natural-language semantics is well beyond the scope of this paper. We make the common
assumption that Function Composition is not (freely) available in the syntax, decomposed or not.
18 This account predicts that if an adjunct can be independently shown to to compose with ⟨e, st⟩ complements,
then it should be able to occur between the tough-predicate and the innitival clause. However, we are not
aware of any such adjuncts.
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(54) (To Mary) cholesterol is important (*to Mary) to avoid (to Mary)
(55) (At XMas) cholesterol is important (*at XMas) to avoid (at XMas)
According to our account, (54) is not the result of moving the experiencer PP because the
crucial type mismatch underlying intervention occurs between Exp0 and AP. We propose
that (54) involves the attachment of Exp0 to a node higher than aP that denotes a proposition.
This variable placement of Exp0 follows from the fact that its semantic contribution is to
shift the judge argument of the denotation function, which the tough-predicate will pick
up as long as it is in the scope of Exp0. As a result, Exp0 can still modify the judge of a
tough-predicate if it attaches to a high projection in the clausal spine. In this regard, Exp0 is
crucially dierent from other argument-introducing heads like v0 or Appl0, which modify
events and are hence restricted to the domain of the clause lower than the existential
closure of the event argument. In the same vein, adjuncts can merge at dierent points in
the clausal spine, as long as the node denotes a proposition, thus predicting (55).19,20
This analysis of the intervention eect extends to pretty-predicate constructions and
GDPs. The latter are addressed in the next section. Pretty-predicates dier from tough-
predicates in that they only have a single denotation that corresponds to the tough-
construction variant (37). It combines with a null-operator structure, which denotes a
property of individuals. As a result, experiencer PPs and adjuncts always intervene be-
tween a pretty-predicate and the embedded clause, identically to the derivation in (52).
Finally, as discussed in section 3.4, argument PPs do not intervene when they occur
between the adjective and the embedded clause. The reason is that such a PP is directly an ar-
gument of the adjective’s denotation, unlike experiencer PPs, thereby avoiding intervening
in the semantic composition process, as shown in (56).
19 One general empirical question is whether it is possible for the experiencer PP or adjunct to occur between
the tough-predicate and its subject. Bruening (2014) judges such examples grammatical:
(i) a. The president is [to many people] annoying to listen to.
b. The budget is [at meetings] extremely annoying to talk about. (Bruening 2014: 708,710)
Our account predicts that the placement in (i) is possible, given that the experiencer PP or adjunct can be
introduced between aP and TP. In this case, it will combine with the propositional aP node, but linearly
follow the subject after the subject has undergone regular movement to [Spec, TP]. If the sentences in (i)
are indeed grammatical, they provide additional support for our account. We should note, however, that
the judgments in (i) are contested; a reviewer nds them degraded and we concur. Given that the empirical
facts are murky here, we hesitate to draw rm conclusions from (i).
20 Under a PP-adjunction analysis of experiencer PPs, movement of the PP would also not remedy the semantic-
type mismatch because such movement would leave a trace of either type s or ⟨st , st⟩ (depending on one’s
assumptions), neither of which could compose with the AP in a tough-construction.
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(56) Argument PPs do not result in a semantic-type mismatch
(=32b)These trac cones are [ damaging [ to cars ]] [ Op1 to drive over 1 ].
aP
aP
AP
CP
Op1 PRO to drive over 1
AP
PP
to cars
damaging
a0
these trac cones
: ⟨e, st⟩
: e
: ⟨⟨e, st⟩, ⟨e, st⟩⟩
: ⟨e, st⟩
: ⟨e, st⟩
: st
e
⟨e, ⟨⟨e, st⟩, ⟨e, st⟩⟩⟩
One way of characterising this distinction is that argument PPs are internal arguments, but
experiencer PPs are external arguments (in the sense of Kratzer 1996). External arguments,
but not internal arguments of an adjective cause intervention. While this distinction might
be a useful characterisation of the intervention, it still does not capture why experiencer
PPs and adjuncts pattern alike with respect to intervention. However, characterising the
intervention in terms of semantic types and composition, as we have done, does capture
this commonality: Both experiencer PPs and adjuncts semantically select for propositions.
An embedded clause with a null operator denotes a property of individuals and hence is
unable to compose with experiencer PPs and adjuncts.
Before moving on to applying our account to GDPs in the next section, we would like to
point out that the present analysis also captures, without further ado, an observation that
Hartman (2012b: 95) attributes to David Pesetsky (p.c.): only experiencers in the highest
clause cause intervention.21 Consider (57) and (58). In (57b), the experiencer PP to Mary does
not cause an intervention eect because it does not modify the highest tough-predicate.
In (58), PP modication of the highest tough-predicate leads to ungrammaticality in the
tough-construction (58b), but not in the expletive construction (58a).
(57) a. It is impossible for it to be important [to Mary] to avoid cholesterol.
b. Cholesterol is impossible for it to be important [to Mary] to avoid.
(Hartman 2012b: 95)
(58) a. It is important [to Mary] for it to be easy to avoid cholesterol.
b. *Cholesterol is important [to Mary] for it to be easy to avoid.
(Hartman 2012b: 95)
Hartman (2012b) captures this contrast by appealing to a dierence between A-movement
and A-movement: only A-movement is subject to PP intervention. The account developed
here likewise derives these facts, but without resorting to the A/A-distinction. In (57b) and
(58b), the null operator moves to the edge of the highest embedded clause, below the higher
21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance of this restriction to our account.
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tough-predicate in the matrix clause. The higher tough-predicate is the tough-construction
variant, while the lower tough-predicate is the expletive construction variant. Therefore,
an experiencer PP can modify the lower tough-predicate (59a), where the AP denotes a
proposition, but an experiencer PP cannot modify the higher tough-predicate without
resulting in the by-now-familiar semantic-type mismatch (59b).
(59) a. Cholesterol is impossibletc [ λx for it to be importantexpl [to Mary] [to avoid x ]].
Op-mvt
b. *Cholesterol is importanttc [to Mary] [ λx for it to be easyexpl [to avoid x ]].
Op-mvt
4.3. Gapped degree phrases
GDPs dier from tough-constructions in both their syntax and semantics, primarily as a
result of the embedded clause being an argument not of the adjective, but of the degree
operator too. Nevertheless, like tough-constructions, the embedded clause in a GDP is a
null-operator structure, and thus the analysis in section 4.2 extends to intervention in GDPs
as well. In this section, we briey review Nissenbaum and Schwarz’s (2011) proposal for
GDPs and show that intervention in GDPs is the result of an irresolvable semantic-type
mismatch induced by the null-operator structure, in the same vein as tough-constructions.
Nissenbaum and Schwarz propose that the degree phrase in a GDP is a null-operator
structure, which is interpreted via compose, a semantic operation that exhaustively ap-
plies Function Application (FA) and Predicate Modication (PM) to its two arguments
(Nissenbaum 2000). To illustrate, the derivation of (60) is given in (61) and (62).
(60) The table is too heavy [ Op1 [ to lift t 1 ]]↝ LF: The table is [ heavy ] [ λx [ too [ to lift x ]]]
(61) a. ⟦heavy⟧ = λxe λdd λws . heavyw(x) ≥ d
b. ⟦Op1 [ too [ to lift t 1 ]]⟧ =
λxe λf⟨d,st⟩ λws . ∃d [f (d)(w) ∧ ¬∃w ′ ∈ Accw [ f (d)(w ′) ∧ lift(x)(w ′) ]]
(62) a. compose (⟦λx [ too [ to lift x ]]⟧)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶⟨e, ⟨⟨d, st⟩, st⟩⟩ (⟦heavy⟧)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶⟨e, ⟨d, st⟩⟩ = (by PM)
b. λy . compose (⟦λx [ too [ to lift x ]]⟧ (y))´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶⟨⟨d, st⟩, st⟩ (⟦heavy⟧ (y))´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶⟨d, st⟩ = (by FA)
c. λy . ⟦λx [ too [ to lift x ]]⟧ (y) (⟦heavy⟧ (y))
The derivation in (62) proceeds as follows: First, compose takes heavy and the degree
phrase as its two arguments (62a). Second, PM abstracts over the rst individual argument
of heavy and the degree phrase (62b). compose applies to these two arguments after PM.
Third, FA applies wherein the degree phrase takes heavy as its argument. The result is a
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property of individuals, an ⟨e, st⟩-function (62c). Fourth, the property of individuals will
apply to the base-generated matrix subject the table.
As (62) makes clear, there is no point in the derivation of a GDP where an experiencer PP
or an adjunct could be interleaved without resulting in a semantic-type mismatch because
no relevant constituent in a GDP denotes a proposition (st ), the semantic type required
for composition with an experiencer PP or adjunct. Therefore, even though the semantics
of GDPs are more nuanced than those of ordinary tough-constructions, intervention in
both results from an irresolvable semantic-type mismatch induced by the null-operator
structure. The analysis that we have proposed for tough-constructions thus extends to
GDPs without further stipulation.
5. Conclusion
Hartman (2011, 2012a,b) contributes the novel observation that in tough-constructions, an
experiencer PP cannot intervene between the tough-predicate and the embedded innitival
clause. He argues that this intervention eect provides evidence for the long-movement
analysis of tough-constructions, wherein the matrix subject originates in the embedded
clause and undergoes a series of movement steps into the matrix subject position.
In this paper, we have argued that this restriction is in fact part of a larger generalisation.
The central empirical observation is that the same intervention eect occurs in nonmove-
ment structures, namely pretty-predicate constructions and gapped degree phrases. We
proposed that what unies these three constructions is that the embedded clause in all of
them is a null-operator structure. Thus, the more general restriction is that no experiencer
PP (or adjunct) may intervene between an adjective and a null-operator structure. We
argued that this restriction is semantic in nature, the result of an irresolvable semantic-type
mismatch between an experiencer PP (or adjunct) and a null-operator structure. Crucially,
this larger pattern would remain unaccounted for on the long-movement analysis of tough-
constructions. However, the analysis presented in this paper shows that a uniform account
of the intervention eects falls out from a base-generation analysis of tough-constructions
as an incompatibility in the semantic composition. Upon closer scrutiny, the intervention
facts thus provide strong support for the base-generation analysis of tough-constructions.
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